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THE LOCKE REPUBLICAN DEBATE AND THE
PARADOX OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
EARLY AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE·
DAVID SCHULTZ··
INTRODUCTION

Recent debates surrounding the intellectual and ideological origin
of the American Founding I have primarily focused upon whether the
basis of early American political thought is either Lockean or Republi
can in character. 2 These debates question which of several differing
philosophies most influenced colonial leaders and the subsequent de
velopment of American legal history. According to one view, the
more influential philosophy was a Liberal tradition originating with
John Locke's Two Treatises of Government 3 that stressed the impor
• Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 1990 annual Northeastern
Political Science Association Convention, Providence, Rhode Island and the 1990 annual
Pennsylvania Political Science Association Convention, Williamsport, Pennsylvania.
•• B.A., Harper College; M.A., Rutgers University; M.A., State University of New
York at Binghamton; Ph.D., University of Minnesota; Assistant Professor, Gustavus
Adolphus College.
1. "Founding" refers to the political character or political values that were impor
tant in the formulation of early American and subsequent political thought.
2. See J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLmCAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATI..ANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADmON 506-53 (1975) [hereinafter
POCOCK I]; Pocock, Republicanism and Ideo/agia Americana, 1987 J. HIST. IDEAS 325-46
[hereinafter Pocock II]; see also G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC:
1776-1787, 100-03, 106-07, 424-25, 429, 611 (1969) (discussing the demise of "classical
politics"). See generally J. DIGGINS, THE LoST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLmcs: VIRTUE,
SELF-INTEREST, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1984); L. HARTZ, THE LIB
ERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 3-5 (1983).
3. J. LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (T. Cook ed. 1947) (Chiswell ed.
1680).
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tance of political liberty, limited government, a natural rights philoso
phy, and a right to property, among other values. 4 Proponents of the
other approach argue that the more influential philosophy was a Re
pUblican tradition, inspired most directly by James Harrington's The
Commonwealth o/Oceana,s that emphasized political liberty, equality,
popular government, a fear of political corruption, and a linkage be
tween property ownership, distribution, and political power in soci
ety. 6 Still another and perhaps more practical view stressed the
influence of Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws 0/
England. 7
Until recently, such debates concerning the nature of the philoso
phies which influenced the development of early American law were
only of academic interest to historians and political scientists. Today,
this issue has taken on new meaning and become a subject of interest
among lawyers and constitutional scholars. Debate in the legal com
munity is now focused on the importance of the repUblican tradition in
America as it relates to issues of constitutional interpretation, adjudi
cation, and the determination of the federal judiciary'S role in Ameri
can politics. 8 Siding with either the Lockean or Republican position9
may commit a person to a set of politics that either advocates a power
ful regulatory state or is inherently sympathetic to individual liberty or

4. II id. 11 124.
5. J. HARRINGTON, THE CoMMONWEALTH OF OcEANA (1656), reprinted in J.
POCOCK, THE POLrnCAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 155-361 (1977) [hereinafter
POCOCK III]. The Republican tradition was also remotely influenced by Roman and other
classical writers such as Aristotle.
6. POCOCK I, supra note 2, at 385-89.
7. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (rev. ed. 1979)
(1st ed. 1765-1769); see. e.g., F. McDONALD, Novus DRDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLEC
TUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 10-24 (1985); Lutz, The Relative Influence ofEuro
pean Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 189, 189-91 (1984).
8. See. e.g., M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRrnCAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitu
tion, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Fallon, What Is Republicanism. and Is It Worth Reviving?,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American
Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57 (1987); Michelman, Traces of Self
Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986); Sunstein, Beyond the RepUblican Revival, 97
YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29 (1985). The issue of the American Founding and the Republican Revival in con
stitutionallaw dominated volume 97, issue 8 of the Yale Law Journal (1988) and volume
29, issue 1 of the William and Mary Law Review (1987).
9. See infra notes 27-84 and accompanying text for an explanation of Republican
and Lockean values.
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perhaps occasionally indifferent to it.IO
These studies have been insightful, but they have also been remiss
in at least two ways. First, they have.been preoccupied with the exclu
sivity of either the Lockean or Republican character of the Founding
while ignoring the existence of other political traditions, II including
the importance and emergence of an American legal tradition indebted
to Blackstone,12 as rival and significant influences upon political de
bate in early American history. This is especially odd in the case of
scholarly legal commentary.
Second, dominant interpretations of the American Founding have
been confined to political rhetoric or have been concerned only with
what colonial and early Americans have said about politics and polit
ical issues, regardless of the context or the existence of other and per
haps contradictory assertions about the same or similar subject. 13
These interpretations do not adequately address how the Lockean or
Republican rhetoric permeated political consciousness and influenced
the way Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries acted
upon their political beliefs. These approaches also fail to link political
utterances to other kinds of pronouncements on the same or similar
subjects. As Michael Lienesch noted in his study of the sources of
early American political thought,14 many scholars ignore the many
10. S. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED DocTRINE: LocKE, LIBERALISM, AND THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 4-5 (1990).
11. Other commentators have claimed that American political thought is indebted to
Puritan and Calvinist religious thought. W. MCWILLIAMS, THE IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN
AMERICA 112-32 (1973); P. MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS 1-15 (1956).
Others credit Scottish Enlightenment thOUght. See. e.g., G. WILLS, EXPLAINING
AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST ix (1981). For a criticism of the latter, see Draper, Hurne &
Madison: The Secrets of Federalist Paper No. 10, 58 ENCOUNTER 34 (1983). Several au
thors have also noted the appearance of other "tongues" or influences in early American
political thought. Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion ": The Discourse ofPolitics in
1787,45 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 3-7 (1988).
12. For discussion relating to the influence of Blackstone on early America, see F.
McDoNALD, supra note 7, at 10-24; D. LocKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE (1938); .
L. WARDEN, THE LIFE OF BLACKSTONE (1938); Lutz, supra note 7, at 193; Whelan, Prop
erty as Artifice: Hurne and Blackstone, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 102-03 (J. Pennock &
J. Chapman eds. 1980).
13. R. HANSON, THE DEMOCRA~IC IMAGINATION IN AMERICA: CoNVERSATIONS
WITH OUR PAST 22-53 (1985). Hanson described liberal democracy as a "rhetorical tradi
tion" that engages in the essential contest over the meaning of key liberal terms. ld. at 28.
Hanson, however, confined his study or understanding of political terms to the level of
rhetoric and failed to engage the political/legal and institutional forces that may have
shaped or questioned the influence of the language and theory that he wished to examine.

See id.
14. M. LIENESCH, NEW ORDER OF THE AGES: TIME, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1988).
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different languages or "persuasions" that influenced the Founders.
Lienesch observed that "because of the porous and penetrable nature
of these persuasions, a thinker of the time could even be attracted si
multaneously to contradictory or even mutually exclusive concepts." IS
In his defense of a Lockean-Liberal interpretation of the American
Founding that challenged the Republican interpretation, J.P. Diggins
noted that historical scholarship on the American Founding reveals
that specific political language was used, but not why it was used or
how the language influenced action. 16
The need to explain how specific political vocabulary influenced
actions in early American history leads to an interesting problem for
any interpretation of the American Founding. If any theory about the
Founding is to be considered viable, it must not only accurately de
scribe the political rhetoric used, but must also explain how such rhet
oric was translated into political action and into the creation of
politicalllegal institutions indebted to a particular political philoso
phy. In short, any viable interpretation must demonstrate some en
during institutional legacy associated with that language beyond the
level of political rhetoric in order to claim that the language has in fact
significantly influenced American politics beyond some semantic
leve1. 17 Present arguments concerning the Founding have thus far
failed to do this because these arguments have not attempted to go
beyond the rhetoric of a particular language to see how it manifested
itself in concrete political institutions.
This article presents a discussion of early American political theo
ries and outlines some of the commentary in this area. The article
then discusses state law on property rights and eminent domain as one
means to examine the above claims and to clarify current debates con
cerning the character of the foundations of American politics. This
article proposes that present debates over a specific American political
character have been too abstract, unhistorical, and confined to the
level of political rhetoric. The debates have ignored the more impor
tant and specific institutional influence these values mayor may not
have had at different times in early American history. Examination of
early state law offers a test of the strength or depth of how a particular
tradition moved from the realm of political debate, permeated political
15. Id. at 13.
16. J. DIGGINS, supra note 2, at 361.
17. This suggests that not all acts of speech are necessarily speech-arts, or that not all
types of utterances are necessarily speech-acts. For a discussion of speech-acts, see J. Aus
TIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962).

1991]

THE LOCKE REPUBLICAN DEBATE

159

consciousness, and influenced the actual development of American
law.
This article then proposes that neither the Lockean nor the Re
publican tradition is a satisfactory or complete explanation of nine
teenth century law regarding property rights and eminent domain.
This article argues that the failure of either theses to concretely influ
ence the area of property rights at specific times raises questions about
how satisfactory these general claims about American political values
are when forced to demonstrate influence on a non-rhetorical level.
Specific legal treatment of property in early America demonstrates
how the Founders may have said one thing in their political pro
nouncements but did another in actual political practice. This para
dox makes it difficult to claim that our Founding or subsequent
history was exclusively Liberal or RepUblican, or that either of the
main theories of the American Founding can exclusively account for
how early Americans actually acted in regard to what they said, at
least in regard to an important political concept such as property.
I.

PROPERTY, POLITICAL THEORY, AND THE CONSTITUTION

The concept of property rights had an important yet ambiguous
role in early American politics, political theory, and law. One purpose
of the right to property was to define and limit legislative power and to
preserve individual liberty by providing a defense against the arbitrary
and intrusive power of the state. For example, James Madison de
scribed property broadly to include an individual's opinions and be
liefs.18 He argued that "[p]roperty as well as personal rights ... is an
essential object of the laws" necessary to the promotion of free govern
ment. 19 Alexander Hamilton stated that the preservation of private
property was essential to liberty and a republican government. 20
Thomas Jefferson depicted property as a "natural right" of mankind. 2 I
John Adams described a proper balance of property in society as im
portant to maintaining republican government. 22 Thomas Paine felt
18. VI THE WRmNGS OF JAMES MADISON 101-03 (G. Hunt ed. 1906) [hereinafter
J. MADISON] (reprinting a piece by Madison which appeared in The National Gazette on
March 29, 1792).
19. P. LARKIN, PROPERTY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 156 (1930); J. MADISON,
supra note 18, at 101.
20. J. CooKE, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 78 (1982); THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 587
88 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
21. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), reprinted in
THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 396-97 (M. Peterson ed. 1975).
22. McKeon, The Development of the Concept of Property in Political Philosophy: A
Study in the Background of the Constitution, 48 INT'L J. OF ETHICS 297,356-57 (1938).
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that the state was instituted to protect the natural right of property,23
and Noah Webster would later link property to virtue, freedom, and
power. 24 Finally, numerous Anti-Federalists described a society as
free when it protected property rights or equalized property distribu
tions. 25 While these two notions might lead to contradictory state ac
tions, this contradiction was apparently not evident to most
Republicans.
While current debates stress the importance of either Lockean
Liberalism or the Atlantic Republican tradition as key to understand
ing the character of early American politics,26 these are only two of at
least three political theories and views on property that were impor
tant in colonial America and at the time of the writing of the Constitu
tion. The third relates to the writings of Sir William Blackstone. This
article briefly reviews these three political views.
A.

John Locke and the Naturalness of Property Rights

The writings of John Locke arguably had the most influence on
early America. This influence has been noted by many scholars. 27
For example, Steven Dworetz, in his examination of the appeal of
Locke's political philosophy prior to and during the American
Revolution, claimed that Locke was the most frequently cited source
among the colonists during the Revolutionary Era. 28 Carl Becker ar
gued that Locke's influence can be traced to the writings of Jefferson,
especially in certain passages in the Declaration of Independence. 29
Specifically, Becker noted how Jefferson's adoption of Locke's views
on the right to revolution and a natural rights philosophy and even the
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 353.

M. LIENESCH, supra note 14, at 93.
Bryan, Letter of Centinel, I, in ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS: SE
LECTED DOCUMENTS 141 (J. Lewis ed. 1967); Winthrop, Letter of Agrippa, II, in ANTI
FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra, at 161; Winthrop,
Letter of Agrippa, III, in ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS: SELECTED Docu
MENTS, supra, at 163; Winthrop, Letter of Agrippa, IV, in ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS
FEDERALISTS: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra, at 166.
26. See supra notes 27-84 and accompanying text for a description of the two sides to
this debate.
27. J. DIGGINS, supra note 2, at 60-61; L. HARTZ, supra note 2, at 6; T. PANGLE,
THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VISION OF THE AMERICAN
FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LocKE 2 (1988).
28. S. DWORETZ, supra note 10, at 43-44. In his examination of Revolutionary War
era citations to Locke, Dworetz noted over 760 references to the philosopher. Id. at 44.
This number reflects a greater number of references to Locke than to any other individual.
Id. at 45.
29. C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HIS
TORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS 27 (1970).
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occurrence of the phrase "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"3o
in the Declaration of Independence indicated that the Founding Fa
thers read and were influenced by Locke. 31 Thomas Pangle, in his
analysis of Republican and Lockean thOUght in colonial America,
claimed that the Founders interpreted classical Republican thought
through the writings of Locke. 32 The result of such a "filtered" inter
pretation was to make Locke's philosophy superior to that of its chief
ideological rival, Republicanism. Louis Hartz made the first and per
haps the most influential argument that American political thought is
indebted to Locke. Hartz argued that Locke is "America's philoso
pher" and that American political thought is essentially Lockean. 33
Even J.G.A. Pocock, one of the staunchest defenders of the Republi
can thesis, acknowledged the influence of Locke's views, although he
. disagreed on the matter of their importance. 34 Despite disagreements,
these writers and others acknowledge that Locke's views on property
influenced colonial as well as post-colonial political debate. 3s
Locke's theory of property has been interpreted as justifying both
modern capitalist accumulation and traditional Christian natural
laws. 36 While both of these interpretations have some merit, the bour
geois interpretation of Locke37 was not the Locke the colonists and
Founders read. Instead, the bourgeois Locke did not emerge perhaps
30. See II J. LocKE, supra note 3, ~ 87 (Locke discussed "life, liberty, and estate").
31. C. BECKER, supra note 29, at 27.
32. T. PANGLE, supra note 27, at 2, 35.
33. L. HARTZ, supra note 2, at 59-61. Hartz's evidence for this claim rests in his
analysis of several historical periods in American history, for example, the American
Revolution, the Civil War, and the Progressive Era, and in his subsequent demonstration
that the political issues debated during these periods were conducted in essentially Lockean
terms. Id.
34. See POCOCK I, supra note 2, at 423-24.
35. See J. DIGGINS, supra note 2, at 192-229; L. HARTZ, supra note 2, at 17-18; P.
LARKIN, supra note 19, at 154-56; II V. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT 287 (1930); Hamilton, Property-According to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864, 872-80
(1932).
36. C. MACPHERSON, THE POLmCAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
HOBBES TO LocKE 245 (1962). Macpherson argued that Locke's discussions of money,
property, and accumulation throughout his writings point to a political philosophy that
supports capitalist acquisition and logic. Macpherson labeled this political philosophy
"possessive individualism." Id. at 263-71. A different view of Locke discounted the capi
talist ethos in Locke's writings and concluded that there was a strong Christian influence to
his writings. See L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 246 (1965); J. TuLLY, A
DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LocKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES 130, 175 (1980). In
criticizing Macpherson's reading of Locke, Strauss stated, "Locke's doctrine of property is
directly intelligible today if it is taken as the classic doctrine of 'the spirit of capitalism'
...." L. STRAUSS, supra, at 246.
37. The interpretation of Locke as a philosopher that sustains capitalism often de
scribes him as the "bourgeois" Locke.
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until the nineteenth century. 38 What these interpretations ignore is
the important political character of Locke's theory of property rights
in the Two Treatises, and the historical context of the Two Treatises as
a radical Whig political argument against the Tories and the power of
the British Crown during the 1680s and 1690s. 39
For the Founders, in opposition to the abuses of the Crown,
Locke's ideas defended the principles of limited government, the natu
ral rights of men, and the right to revolution. Thus, it was in this
context that the early American conception of property was situated.
Accordingly, the history of Locke's theory of property is primarily
political, with the language of property used to defend the political
liberty of Englishmen (including the colonies) against the Crown. 4O
As noted by Becker and others, it was this political linkage of property
to personal power that was most influential on America. 41
Locke argued in both the First and Second Treatises that the pro
tection of property is the goal of civil society.42 Locke proposed that
property is a natural and pre-political institution given to man by God.
A property interest gives the owner a singular and absolute control
over something which no one, including the state, could violate. 43
Property ownership of a thing44 was based upon ownership of one's
body and labor such that anything mixed with the labor of a person
38. S. DWORETZ, supra note 10, at 117, 133.
39. See, e.g., R. AsHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLmcs & LocKE'S Two Treatises of
Government 181-227 (1986); Fellman, The European Background of Early American Ideas
Concerning Property, 14 TEMP. L.Q. 497, 502-06 (1940).
40. Some commentators have claimed that Locke's concept of property, as well as
the Liberal tradition as a whole, embodies a radical-conservative tension that can be traced
to seventeenth century political conflicts that occurred while Liberal ideology was being
formed. See R. ASHCRAFT, supra note 39, at 183-85. The implications of Ashcraft's argu
ment suggest that many of Locke's concepts might embody several different meanings, and
this might also apply to property. Different Founders appropriated and interpreted the
word property in several different ways, suggesting that property could be described as an
"essentially contested concept." Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROCE. OF AR
ISTOTELIAN Soc'y 167 (1956).
Additionally, Dworetz's exegesis of Locke suggested that Locke's view of property
was tied to liberty, consent, and limited government, the notion of property that the Ameri
can Revolutionaries noted. S. DWORETZ, supra note 10, at 70-74.
41. C. BECKER, supra note 29, at 27-42; P. LARKIN, supra note 19, at 137-45; F.
McDONALD, supra note 7, at 10-15.
42. II J. LOCKE, supra note 3, ~ 88; see also J. MADISON, supra note 18, at 102
(stating that "[g]overnment is instituted to protect property of every sort.").
43. Aylmer, The Meaning and Definition of "Property" in Seventeenth-Century Eng
land, 86 PAST & PRESENT 87, 93-95 (1980).
44. Locke's theory of property was an "in rem" or thing theory of ownership as
opposed to a "relational" theory of ownership.
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became personal property. 45
In Locke's view, property included more than the possessions of
individuals. Property referred to one's "Life, Liberty, and Estate."46
"Property" was a general political term referring to all the personal
and political rights of individuals with ownership of one's body and
talents premised upon the natural freedom of individuals. 47 These
comments of Locke, along with the placing of property in a state of
nature, indicate that property was meant to affirm the natural political
rights and liberties of individuals against the state,48 and not necessar
. ily to only be a tool of economic development. 49 These natural rights
are not lost to the state, but instead "[t]he supreme power cannot take
from any man part of his property without his own consent; for the
preservation of property being the end of government and that for
which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that
the people should have property."50
Thus, when Locke argued that the protection of property is the
end or goal of government, or that each individual should have prop
erty, he argued that government should protect the political liberties
of individuals. It is a misreading of Locke to suppose that his theory
of property is essentially a defense of capitalist accumulation, although
it may be incidentally SO.51 It is also wrong to assume that the protec
tion of property means an absolute ban upon government interference
with the material possessions of its citizens. Property is to be pro
tected because it is associated with the political liberties of individuals,
and is important to individual self-expression, identity, and personal
ity.52 Many colonial American readings of Locke's theory of property
45. II J. LocKE, supra note 3, 11 27.
46. Id. 11 123.
47. lid. 11 67; II id. 11 5.
48. R. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 198 (1985).
Smith argued that the core meaning of Lockean-Liberalism, and presumably property, is to
"promote reflective self-direction, or rational liberty." Id. at 198-201.
49. W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETfS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 126 (1975). Nelson argued
that legal recognition of property rights expanded after the American Revolution. While
indicating that the reasons for this expansion are unclear, Nelson speculated that
"[p]erhaps the extension of property doctrine may best be explained by a tendency of the
postrevolutionary generation to equate the protection of property with the preservation of
liberty." [d.
50. II J. LocKE, supra note 3, 11 138.
51. Macpherson contended that Locke's views were a defense of capitalism. C.
MACPHERSON, supra note 36, at 220-21. For a response to Macpherson's bourgeois inter
pretation of Locke, see R. AsHCRAFT, supra note 39, at 185.
52. II J. LocKE, supra note 3, 1111 28-31; J. TULLY, supra note 36, at llO-ll, 121,
131, 143; Fellman, supra note 39, at 505; Hamilton, supra note 35, at 864, 868.
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noted this connection between personal political liberty and property
ownership. These interpretations agreed with Locke that property
rights deserved a somewhat absolute protection against government
regulation. 53

B. James Harrington and Republicanism
J.G.A. Pocock argued in The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine
Political Thought and the Atlantic Republic Tradition that a second
description of property is found in the neoclassical Republican tradi
tion that influenced American political thought. 54 This Republican
tradition can be traced back to the classical writings of Aristotle, the
Romans, Machiavelli, and sixteenth century humanists in Florence,
Italy. 55 This school's primary influence on colonial America was
James Harrington's utopian treatise, The Commonwealth of Oceana.
According to Pocock, the Atlantic Republic tradition (Republi
canism) is characterized bya political philosophy 'emphasizing the
"vita activa" (active life) of political engagement as opposed to the
contemplative and withdrawn life of the Christian world. 56 Thus, the
Republican tradition stressed the importance of a politically engaged
citizenry active in a small homogeneous community. It was a political
philosophy committed to popular government, political liberty, and a
relatively equal distribution of wealth or property ownership within a
political community. 57 The reason for the preoccupation with this lat
ter point was that Republican writers were fearful of private avarice
and interest corrupting the political community. 58 Pocock proposed
that avarice upset the public virtues necessary for the maintenance of a
republican form of government, and once this type of government was
infected by corruption, its degeneration into tyranny was inevitable. 59
Perhaps the most obvious sign of corruption in a republic was the
unequal distribution of wealth or property. If property were maldis
tributed, according to Pocock, Republicans feared that some individu
als or groups (factions as they would later be called by James
53. S. DWORETZ, supra note 10, at 71-74; Aylmer, supra note 43, at 95-97. The list
of colonial leaders influenced by the political views of Locke includes Madison, Jefferson,
Hamilton, Samuel Adams, John Adams and John Tyler. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27-30 (1967); C. MERRIAM, AMERICAN POLIT
ICAL THEORIES, NEW YORK 62 (1926); V. PARRINGTON, supra note 35, at 189, 237.
54. POCOCK I, supra note 2, at viii.
55. Id. at vii, 6-15.
56. Id. at 49-56.
57. Id. at 203-07.
58. Id. at 133-35.
59. Id. at 208-09.
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Madison) would gain too much political power and upset popular gov
ernment and individual liberty. 60 One "solution" to preventing cor
ruption and encouraging political "regeneration" would be to
maintain a relatively equal distribution of property ownership in the
political community. 61
James Harrington's The Commonwealth of Oceana is indebted to
and part of th~. Florentine traditiun that linked the maintenance of
Republican government, liberty, and popular government to the distri
bution of property within a community.62 Harrington described the
political institutions necessary to maintain a republican form of gov
ernment. In Oceana, he argued for the need to achieve a balance of
power in a commonwealth between the king, the nobility, and the peo
ple if tyranny was to be avoided and a limited republican form of gov
ernment was to be sustained. 63 Crucial to that balance of power, or the
"doctrine of balance" in Harrington's words, was the equal distribu
tion of property among the above three groupS.64 Grariting anyone
group, such as the king, a disproportionate amount of control over
property would give that group excessive power in the republic. 65
Harrington saw the doctrine of balance as necessary to limit the
Crown's power. 66 The doctrine of balance was rooted in the tradi
tional neoclassical fear of excessive or maldistributions of wealth as a
sign of an unhealthy commonwealth. 67 A free republic could only be
maintained if excessive concentrations of wealth in the possession of
few could be avoided. 68 Dispersed and relatively equal ownership of
property was crucial to limiting political power and promoting
freedom. 69
Harrington, perhaps over-simplistically, adopted this Republican
view of property and saw a correlation between personal property and
political power. While Harrington and Locke agreed that property
was important to independence and status in society, Harrington did
not share Locke's view that the goal of society was to protect property,
or that the state could not regulate it. 70 Harrington also did not be
60.
61.

62.
63.
64.
65.

66.
67.
68.
69.

70.

Id. at 209.
Id. at 104-20.
POCOCK III, supra note
[d. at 167, 405.
[d.
Id. at 164.
Fellman, supra note 39,
POCOCK III, supra note
Fellman, supra note 39,
Id.
POCOCK III, supra note

5, at 6-16.

at 507-09.
5, at 164; POCOCK I, supra note 2, at 209.
at 509-10.
5, at 137-38, 145.
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lieve that existing property distributions were natura!.'l Property
rules were conventional and distributions could be altered or regulated
to promote Republican forms of government. Harrington would pro
tect individual liberty not by protecting the natural property rights of
individuals, but by redistributing property to ensure a Republican and
limited form of government.72
According to Pocock, Harrington's doctrine of balance was inter
preted by his followers as an argument against executive patronage
and power. 73 Therefore, it became an important ideological tool of
opposition for the American colonials against King George III,74 and
a clear influence upon the early formulation of American politics such
that the American Founding can be linked to the Atlantic Republican
Tradition. 75 The influence of James Harrington, the principal Euro
pean source of colonial Republican thought, can best be seen in the
writings of the Anti-Federalists who articulated the importance of
property divisions in preserving state Republican governments. 76
For example, Samuel Bryan, in his Letters of Centinel, closely
followed Harrington's sentiments when he argued that a "republican,
or free government, can only exist where the body of the people are
virtuous, and where property is pretty equally divided."77 Addition
ally, John Adams, a Federalist, was also influenced by Harrington in
his advocacy of the position that the distribution of political power in
society flows from the distribution of property.78 Even Thomas J effer
son's "wards system," or the political reorganization of Virginia coun
ties into hundreds of equally-sized school districts,79 along with the
broad distribution of property ownership, was a recognition of the re
71. Id. at 405.
72. Id.; POCOCK I, supra note 2, at 386-90.
73. POCOCK III, supra note 5, at 143-45; POCOCK I, supra note 2, at 416-20.
74. POCOCK III, supra note 5, at 144.
75. POCOCK I, supra note 2, at 506-07. In opposition to this notion, Thomas Pan
gle's The Spirit 0/ Modern Republicanism questioned how direct and coherent the Republi
can tradition was in America. Pangle argued that the influence of the Republican tradition
was felt indirectly because it was read and interpreted by the Founders through the work of
Locke. T. PANGLE, supra note 27, at 28-39.
76. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 70-75.
77. Bryan, Letter 0/ Centinel, I, in ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS: SE
LECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 25, at 141. These letters were published to urge against
the abandonment of the Articles of Confederation and to oppose the adoption of the then
proposed United States Constitution. Introduction to ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDER
ALISTS: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 25, at 1-5.
78. McKeon, supra note 22, at 354-57.
79. T. JEFFERSON, A Bill/or the More General Diffusion 0/ Knowledge, in WRmNGS
367-68 (1984); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Joseph Priestly (Jan. 27, 1800), re
printed in WRITINGS, supra, at 1073.
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publican link between property, independence, and limited
government.80
Harrington's views also surfaced in James Madison's Federalist
No. 10, where property distributions were described as the chief cause
of factionalism in society.81 Nevertheless, the RepUblican solution of
equalizing property so as to remove sources of factionalism was re
jected. James Madison, while noting how important property distri
butions were to popular government, created political mechanisms,
such as checks and balances and separation of powers, to render these
distributions politically less significant. 82 In Madison's view, inequali
ties in property, as rooted in the differences in human talents and fac
ulties, would be rendered politically unimportant if appropriate checks
were instituted to neutralize some property interests by others. 83
Somewhat conversely, Gordon Wood argued in The Creation of the
American Republic: 1776-1787 that this transformation of the tradi
tional Republican concept of property in the Federalist Papers and the
United States Constitution represented the "end of classical politics,"
because it minimized the need to eliminate avarice and vice from the
political system and instead sought mechanisms to make private inter
est and property divisions serve the public good. 84
C.

Blackstone and the Conventional Nature of Property

While the influence of Locke and Harrington upon early Ameri
can political thought are often noted, other commentators have sug
gested that Sir William Blackstone's views on property have been
overlooked as an important influence on eighteenth century perspec
tives on property and early American property law. 8s In an article
relating to both the influence of David Hume and Blackstone on com
mon law notions of property, Frederick Whelan suggested that Black
stone's view of property represented "the 'official' view of property in
80. POCOCK III, supra note 5, at 150-51 (noting Harrington's influence upon Jeffer
son and Noah Webster); H. SMITH, HARRINGTON AND HIS OcEANA: A STUDY OF A 17TH
CENTURY UTOPIA AND ITS INFLUENCE IN AMERICA 152 (1914) (discussing Harrington's
influence in America).
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56 (1. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Fellman, supra
note 39, at 509-16.
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 81, at 56-57; THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at
337-38 (1. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 338-41 (J. Madison)
(1. Cooke ed. 1961).
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 81, at 56-57.
84. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 606-19.
85. F. McDoNALD, supra note 7, at II, 20, 188; Whelan, supra note 12, at 101-04,
114-27.
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the classical liberal era."86 Blackstone's views were generally more
legalistic and conventional than either Locke's or Harrington's. De
spite this general view, there were instances in the Commentaries on
the Laws of England where -Blackstone mirrored the views of Locke.
For example, in volume two of the Commentaries, Blackstone stated:
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination,
and engages the affections of mankind, as the right property; or
that sole and despotic dominion which one man clailns and exer
cises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the
right of any other individual in the universe. 87

of

In this passage, Blackstone described property as an "absolute
right."88 Blackstone proposed that the protection of this right, as well
as the protection of other absolute rights such as security and liberty,
is the "principle aim of society."89
Despite passages suggesting that Blackstone was simply echoing
Locke, there are numerous other instances where Blackstone differed
with Locke and as suggested by Whelan,9O agreed with David Hume,
who denied that property existed in a state of nature91 and instead
claimed that property rights are "not natural but moral."92 For in
stance, Blackstone argued that property was not a natural right but a
conventional institution created by law, habit, or the passage oftime. 93
In volume· one of his Commentaries, Blackstone agreed with Locke
that the protection of property is important and necessary for free
dom. However, Blackstone also indicated that property is not natural
but acquired by usurpation and other means. 94 Blackstone argued
that it is the law and not natural right that determines what can be
owned and the prerogatives associated with the ownership of
property.95
86.

Whelan, supra note 12, at 115.
2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 2. Whelan suggested that this quotation,
read in the overall context of the Commentaries, does not reflect Blackstone's agreement
with Locke that property is a "mere positive right." Whelan, supra note 12, at 11.9.
Rather, Whelan suggested that the ,. 'right of property' is a form of shorthand for a com
plex set of different rights." [d. at 119.
88. Whelan, supra note 12, at 118; see also 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 134
("The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property . . . .").
89. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 120.
90. Whelan, supra note 12, at 120-21, 124-27.
91. D. HUME, On the Origin ofJustice and Property, in HUME'S MORAL AND POLIT
ICAL PHILOSOPHY 60 (H. Aiken ed. 1948).
92. [d.
93. Whelan, supra note 12, at 102-03.
94. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 134.
95. [d.

87.
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In the first volume of the Commentaries, Blackstone described
property as an absolute right of an Englishman,96 yet this right was
tempered by "the laws of the land" and subject to numerous legal re
strictions as described in the second volume. 97 In the second volume,
Blackstone described property ownership as an absolute dominion,
noting that the legal ownership of property had no foundation in na
ture or natural law and that rules prescribing its use and transfer were
determined by society.98 Although Blackstone stated that the protec
tion of property was the principle aim of society, he did not agree with
Locke that the purpose or origin of society resided in the protection of
property rights. In the Introduction to volume one of the Commenta
ries, Blackstone claimed that "[t]he only true and natural foundations
of [s]ociety are the wants and the fears of individuals."99
These two passages could be said to represent contradictory views
on property, and biographers and analyses of Blackstone's writings
have sought to reconcile this contradiction. loo For example, commen
tators have suggested that Blackstone was not a consistent political
theorist but was more concerned with pulling together the existing
contradictory or inconsistent laws of England. 101 This suggests that
Blackstone either had little concern or did not see his different writ
ings on property as inconsistent, but instead as reflective of legal prac
tice at that time in England. Another suggestion, offered by Whelan,
was that Blackstone was not inconsistent when it came to his discus
sion of property. Property rights were absolute for Blackstone, but
only absolute within the lines prescribed by society and law.102 More
over, while first occupation may be the original reason why one has
acquired use of property, continued or legal occupation rests upon
rules of a civil society. In short, an individual's absolute right to prop
erty is tempered by the rights of others or by the public good. 103
Despite some inconsistencies in describing property rights, Black
stone greatly influenced American legal history.l04 Blackstone's biog
raphers claim that his influence was greater in America than in
England and that numerous editions of the Commentaries were
96. Id.
97. 2 id. at 373-83.
98. Id. at 373-74.
99. 1 id. at 47.
100. See, e.g., Whelan, supra note 12, at 118-20.
101. For a review of criticisms of the Commentaries, see D. LocKMILLER, supra
note 12, at 146-48, 162-68; L. WARDEN, supra note 12, at 273-80.
102. Whelan, supra note 12, at 119-20.
103. See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 374.
104. F. McDONALD, supra note 7, at 7.
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shipped to or printed in the colonies. lOS For example, Blackstone's
views on the rights of Englishmen influenced the writing of the Decla
ration of Independence as sixteen of its signers were known to have
purchased and read the Commentaries. l06 At the Constitutional Con
vention, the Founders discussed terms such as "ex post facto laws"
and "due process" in the way that Blackstone had described these
legal concepts. 107 But most importantly, some argue that it was
Blackstone's influence that was especially important in early American
legal history because judges and lawyers (in addition to many of the
Founders such as Jefferson, Hamilton, and Adams) turned to him for
reference as they sought to apply English property law to new Ameri
can social and economic conditions. lOS Jurists such as Marshall, Kent,
and Story turned to Blackstone as the only source and commentary on
the common law and incorporated many of his views into their
"Americanization" of English rules.
In sum, at least three traditions can be considered important in
early American legal and political thought on property. Locke's view
linked property to the natural political liberties and personality of in
dividuals. 109 Harrington linked property to limited and Republican
forms of government,110 while Blackstone's views emphasized the
changing legal nature of property and how the law could alter prop
erty relations. 111 Those who claim that American Founding values
were exclusively Lockean or Republican ignore the fact that there is
no single or uniquely and easily identifiable influence at the level of
political rhetoric because all of these languages were used by early
Americans. 112 No one view predominated colonial American politics.
There is, then, a hybrid of several languages in the "great national
discussion" forming a distinctly American view of property. 113 Yet, if
105.

D. LOCKMILLER, supra note 12, at 169-70; L. WARDEN, supra note 12, at 320

106.
107.
108.

L. WARDEN, supra note 12, at 323.
D. LocKMILLER, supra note 12, at 174.

21.

M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 11

(1977); see Scheiber, The Road to Munn· Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Pur
pose in the State Courts, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329, 359-60 (D. Fleming & B.
Bailyn eds. 1971).

109. See supra notes 29-55 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 56-84 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 85-103 and accompanying text.
112. Horwitz, supra note 8, at 64.
113. Kramnick discussed how the language of our Constitution embodies several dif
ferent languages, often at odds, and usually difficult to separate or discern from one an
other, thus inviting a diversity of interpretations. Kramnick, supra note 11, at 4; see also
M. LIENESCH, supra note 14, at 13 (making a parallel claim).
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there was any consensus among the Framers, it resided in the agree
ment that property was important to individual political liberty.114
Despite these claims about property rights, the important question is
how this rhetoric of property rights was translated into political-insti
tutional mechanisms. In particular, which, if any, political tradition
actually influenced the reality and practice of property rights in Amer
ican politics and law? The second part of this article addresses this
question.

II.

THE TRANSFORMATION AND CONTRADICTIONS
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

While influencing colonial and constitutional debate, the Liberal,
Republican, and legal (Blackstone'S) theories on property may have
influenced other aspects of American legal history. I IS Examples in
clude later court decisions and political debates on property rights and
eminent domain. Yet despite the importance attached to property
rights in Liberal and Republican debates in 1787, these rights were not
treated as inviolable, and it appears that other political languages,
such as the Blackstone legal tradition mentioned above, more clearly
explained how property rights were treated in early American politics
and law.
In his examination of the different political traditions that influ
enced colonial America, Issac Kramnick noted that the language of
"state-centered theories of power and sovereignty" was important in
early constitutional debate and that the reality of creating a govern
ment and nation tempered the excesses of political rhetoric articulated
during the Founding era. 116 For example, according to Alexander
Hamilton, the Constitution was only written to protect property.ll7
Institutional necessity did give property some special protections, but
this necessity did not create a constitutional right to property or pre
clude all state regulation of property rights as might have been sug
114. See R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLmCAL TRADmON AND THE MEN
WHO MADE IT 10-12 (1948).
115. See, e.g., V. PARRINGTON, supra note 35, at 305. Madison's notes on the Con
stitutional Convention indicated numerous discussions of property in the drafting of the
new Constitution. Property qualifications for voting and election to office were discussed.
Madison linked the protection of property and private rights together as the "essential
object of the laws." P. LARKIN, supra note 19, at 156-58; see also Horwitz, supra note 8, at
68 (noting Lockean-Liberal influences in the fifth amendment).
116. Kramnick, supra note 11, at 4, 23-27.
117. THE FEDERALIST No.1, at 3-7 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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gested by Liberal ideology. liS Instead, the Founders, as political
realists, lawyers, and followers of Blackstone and the British legal tra
dition, realized that there may be instances when property rights may
have to be limited for public necessity.
Even if the Constitution did follow Locke's view and treat prop
erty as a natural and absolute barrier against legislative power, there is
evidence that within fifty years after 1787, the political rhetoric of
property as an absolute political right was abandoned in favor of an
economic-utilitarian theory of property rights which was clearly not
Lockean or Republican; at least not Lockean or Republican as the
Founders understood these traditions. 119 In The Transformation of
American Law, Morton Horwitz argued that in early America there
existed a natural or antidevelopmental view of property rights. 120 This
agrarian and "natural" view of property resembled the teachings of
Locke, and stressed the absolute right of individuals over their prop
erty to the exclusion of others. Such a view implied that other parties
were precluded from interfering with another's property and would be
expected to pay damages for trespass or denial of use. 121
A second view of property also surfaced in early American law.
The focus of this view was a more commercial or developmental the
ory of property which made it subject to regulation for the economic
welfare of the community.122
The emergence of a developmental theory of property had several
important consequences. At one level, the theory questioned any
myth about the absolute rights individuals had over property, and
made the ownership of property subject to greater legislative regula
tion than before. At another level, the commercial focus denied that
property rights were natural or that they were as closely tied to indi
vidual political liberty as Locke's politics had assumed.
The developmental theory of property also pitted the economic
interests of landed property owners against the rising commercial class
who sought to limit the rights of the property owners in order to fur
ther economic development. 123 Horwitz argued that these rival inter
118. Sager, Property Rights and the Constitution, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY,
supra note 12, at 376.
119. Dworetz claimed that by this time in history, colonial practice had rejected the
belief that political property rights were immune from regulation. S. DWORETZ, supra
note 10, at 70-71.
120. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 32.
121. Id. at 32-33.
122. Id. at 33-34; M. LIENESCH, supra note 14, at 83.
123. This notion further suggests that different groups or interests in society had
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ests were adjudicated by the state courts throughout this country and
that by 1860, the conflict was resolved in favor of the developmental
theory of rightS. 124 The resolution, which Horwitz described as the
transformation of American law,125 resulted in the emergence of an
instrumental and economic utilitarian depiction of property. This
characterization viewed property rights not as natural or "political"
(as suggested by Liberal rhetoric),126 but as conventional and subject
to regulation and limitation (as suggested by Republican thought) to
promote the economic development of society and the class interests of
a rising entrepreneurial class. 127 This transformation of property law
was aided in part by changes in eminent domain which eroded tradi
tional property rights and made them subject to regulation for the
common good. 128
Changes in American property law occurred within the first 50
years after 1787 as judges adapted British property law, as understood
through Blackstone, to American social-economic conditions.!29 In
the absence of a colonial American law on property, judges changed
English property law to conform to the new United States Constitu
tion. As Morton Horwitz,!30 James Hurst,!3! and G. Edward
White 132 have noted in their respective histories of early American
law, state and federal court judges were important in adapting the
English property law, which was suited to a nation with limited land
tied to feudal privileges, to a large and expanding nation with ample
land. The task of the early American judge was to rewrite property
law to fit the new American needs of commercial development. Thus,
although the same language of property was used in the United States
as in England, the empirical context and referents had changed such
that the meaning and use of the term "property" in America had to be
different ideas about what property was or which type of property rights deserved
protection.
124. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 1-31.
125. Id. at 1-30.
126. "Political" is used here in the sense that property ownership was justified as an
important political tool to limit governmental power.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
128. See infra notes 176-226 and accompanying text.
129. Scheiber, supra note 108, at 360.
130. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 9-12.
131. See J. HURST, LAW AND THE CoNDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINE
TEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 90 (1956).
132. G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADmON: PROFILES OF LEADING
AMERICAN JUDGES 35-37 (1988).
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different than it was in England. 133 The empirical context or referent
of property in early nineteenth century America was different even
from 1776-1787 America.
There are many criticisms of Horwitz's transformation thesis.
Some critics questioned the class conflict theory implicit in his argu
ments, while others questioned the evidence tying state judges to the
interests of a rising commercial class. 134 However, legal scholars do
not disagree regarding the claim that property law changed tremen
dously in the early nineteenth century. Property law did lose much of
its political and natural rights character and became viewed almost
exclusively as an economic commodity that could be regulated for the
public welfare. 13S The great transformation of property law came as a
shift from a political right important to liberty, to an economic good
that could be regulated for economic reasons.136 Legal commentators
on property law agree that this change occurred, and eminent domain
and state judges were important in articulating that change. 137
Much of the political fiction or myth that property rights were
absolute appears to have been abandoned in the law soon after 1787,
suggesting that on the institutional level Liberal rhetoric had minimal
influence, or that the Locke that had emerged was the "bourgeois"
Locke that C.B. Macpherson 138 and others had described.139 Yet
throughout the nineteenth century, American law continued to be
133. For a discussion of the role of context and usage as influencing the meaning of
concepts, see L. WfITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (3d ed. 1958).
134. Hurst, Book Review, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 175-79 (1977) (reviewing M.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860 (1977»; Reid; Book
Review, 55 TEX. L. REv. 1307, 1310-12 (1977) (reviewing M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFOR
MATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860 (1977».
135. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 31-62.
136. Id.
137. White and Hurst agreed with Horwitz on the emerging utilitarian and economic
character of American property law in the early nineteenth century. G. WHITE, supra note
132, at 35-37; J. HURST, supra note 131, at 3-8. Friedman argued that the transformation
of American property law was occurring even before the Revolution. L. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 202 (1973). Friedman noted his agreement with Horwitz on
the economic transformation of American law as a movement from a static to dynamic
theory of property. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 235-36 (2d ed. 1985).
The cause of that transformation was not discussed by Friedman.
138. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
139. Lockean premises dominated much of the political rhetoric of property from
1776-1790 while regulation of property was more consistent with Republican or Black
stone's legalistic values. However, later in the nineteenth century, Lockean ideology did
become more important in American law, especially with the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment and the articulation of liberty of contract and substantive due process con
cepts. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background o/the Law 0/ Eminent Domain, 6 WIS. L.
REV. 67, 81-83 (1931).
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plagued by the "contradiction" that the right to property was absolute
in some respects and not in others. 14O This contradiction suggests that
while Liberal or Republican rhetoric may have been given rhetorical
lip service, a legal tradition stemming from Blackstone may have been
more important in how the judiciary and commentators of the time
thought about and acted in regard to property. Even though there is
evidence that property had been transformed during the early nine
teenth century, there is also evidence that even during the Founding
era, there was a gap between the rhetoric and the reality of property
rights which led to the above transformation.

III.
A.

EMINENT DOMAIN IN EARLY AMERICAN LAW

Early Constitutional History and the Fifth Amendment

While property rights in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries may have been described in Lockean or Republican terms,
early recognition of eminent domain among other forms of American
property regulation meant that property rights were not absolute and
were subject to numerous legislative controls.141 For example, while
Jefferson felt that property was an absolute right, he advocated that
the state should regulate it to abolish primogeniture and promote agri
cultural production. 142 In his role as Secretary of Treasury, Hamilton
accepted some regulation of property as essential to the promotion of
commerce. 143 In addition, numerous jurists and advocates of Republi
canism recognized the need to regulate property to promote individual
freedom.l44 Extensive demand and actual colonial regulation of prop
erty suggests that legal reality conflicted with the political rhetoric of
absolute property rights.
Eminent domain is the sovereign right or power to take private
property for public use. 14S William Stoebuck, in his analysis of the
history of eminent domain, argued that eminent domain can be traced
140. Scheiber, supra note 108, at 332.
141. F. McDONALD, supra note 7, at 10-55 (discussing the legislative limitations on
property rights including regulation of the acquisition and use of property and contracts,
regulation of monopolies, and the construction of debt law). There were numerous restric
tions on property because property was seen to serve community ethical or economic needs
first, and individual convenience second. W. NELSON, supra note 49, at 51-53.
142. F. BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 130 (1974); M.
LIENESCH, supra note 14, at 87-89, 93.
143. J. CooKE, supra note 20, at 73-84.
144. J. MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 61-83,
194-97 (1971).
145. 1 J. SACKMAN & R. VAN BRUNT, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (3d
ed. 1990).
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to the Romans, but the origin of what is considered modem eminent
domain can be found in English feudal law and the natural law tradi
tion. l46 Stoebuck claimed that eminent domain originated in medieval
feudal law granting the king supreme power or eminent domain over
all land in the kingdom. 147 Similarly, in·his historical analysis of emi
nent domain, J.A.C. Grant traced the origin of the concept to natural
law arguments giving the state a natural right to control land to secure
"higher" purposes. 148
Whatever the origin, Stoebuck and Lenhoff agree that eminent
domain came to be seen as an essential attribute of sovereignty which
could not be alienated. By the time the United States Constitution and
the fifth amendment were written, the law recognized that eminent
domain was an inherent power of government (as evidenced by colo
nial use) and not in need of specification. 149
The concept of eminent domain was mentioned by Locke and
Blackstone, among other seventeenth and eighteenth century political
writers. ISO Locke, while defending an absolute right to property as a
political protection against the king, recognized the right of the gov
ernment to take property to the extent that either the owner or his
representative consented. lSI However, Locke did not indicate com
pensation was due when property was taken. William Stoebuck con
tended that a compensation requirement was implicit in Locke's
discussion of taxation. 1S2 Perhaps this is true, yet Stoebuck's own dis
cussion suggested that Parliament and general practice did distinguish
eminent domain, or expropriation, from taxation,IS3 and thus it is not
clear that the restrictions on one applied to the other. Consent was
required for both, but compensation for taxation was certainly not re
quired and it is uncertain if Locke had thought about applying a com
pensation requirement to expropriation.
In his analysis of the just compensation doctrine in early Ameri
can law, Errol Meidinger argued that the first recorded uses of emi
146. Stoebuck, A General Theory 0/ Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 553
(1972); see also Lenhoff, Development 0/ the Concept 0/ Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L.
REV. 596, 596-98 (1942).
147. Stoebuck, supra note 146, at 562-64.
148. Grant, supra note 139, at 67-85.
149. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876) (eminent domain affirmed as an in
herent and implied power of states and federal government).
150. See Lenhoff, supra note 146, at 601-03 (arguing that the origin of the "enforced
sale concept" is in Montesquieu, Pufendorf, and Blackstone).
151. Stoebuck, supra note 146, at 567.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 566-67.
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nent domain in America can be traced to a 1639 Massachusetts statute
authorizing the taking of land to build roads. This statute did not
allow houses, gardens, or orchards to be destroyed. The only compen
sation that would be given to the owner would be for damage to these
items. Land acquisition itself did not merit compensation. ls4 In New
York, Pennsylvania and South Carolina, private property could also
be taken without compensation. ISS Eminent domain was widely used
to acquire land in colonial America. However, as Meidinger,IS6 Hor
witz,ls7 Nelson,lss Stoebuck,ls9 and other commentators l60 have
agreed, neither the principle of just compensation nor a "public use"
limit on acquisition was stipulated in colonial charters or constitu
tions. Horwitz noted that compensation did not become the rule in
the states until the mid-nineteenth century,161 and it was not until
1897 that the Supreme Court required states to compensate for prop
erty acquisition,162 Similarly, public use stipulations only slowly
emerged after the Revolution and in the nineteenth century.163
By 1787, eminent domain was a recognized element of sover
eignty and used by the states to acquire property for projects such as
roads, dams, and schools. However, just compensation was not a
widely accepted pr!lctice despite the fact that Blackstone and parlia
mentary practice endorsed this concept. A review of the history of the
fifth amendment and colonial political thought illustrates the reason
for this apparent contradiction between British and American
practice.
In an article addressing the just compensation clause of the fifth
amendment, one commentator claimed that this contradiction disap
peared when the fifth amendment is viewed as a part of the ideological
shift from Republicanism to Liberalism. l64 The commentator claimed
that colonial America was significantly influenced by a Republican
ideology that had faith in the public legislature to secure the public
154. Meidinger, The "Public Uses" 0/ Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11
ENVTL. L. 1, 13 (1980).
155. Comment, The Origins and Original Significance 0/ the Just Compensation
Clause o/the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694,695 n.6 (1985).
156. Meidinger, supra note 154, at 13-14.
157. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 63.
158. W. NELSON, supra note 49, at 130.
159. Stoebuck, supra note 146, at 591-92.
160. Comment, supra note 155, at 695 n.6.
161. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 63-70.
162. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
163. See infra notes 176-226 and accompanying text.
164. Comment, supra note 155, at 694.
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good. 16S Republicans also believed that excessive property ownership
was a sign of a corrupt polity and counterproductive to republican
government. l66 A legislature thus had the right to redistribute prop
erty to secure both the public good and a republican government. A
compensation requirement would make this property redistribution
costly and difficult.167
According to one commentator, colonial constitutions reflected
this view in that they lacked just compensation statutes, and instead
gave legislatures broad discretion to determine how land may be best
used. Just compensation clauses finally emerged in the 1777 Vermont
and 1780 Massachusetts constitutions, and in the 1787 Northwest Or
dinance. 168 This commentator claimed that these documents repre
sented early shifts from Republican to liberal ideology, which stressed
the growing importance of individual property rights. 169 This transi
tion from Republicanism to Liberalism is reflected in the drafting of
the new United States Constitution and emerged more clearly in the
first Congress and with the passage of the fifth amendment.
Madison introduced the fifth amendment in Congress on June 8,
1789. 170 The amendment as proposed by Madison stated:
No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to
more than one punishment or one trial for the same offense; nor
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor be
obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for
public use, without a just compensation. l71

No debate on the takings clause was ever recorded, although there
were debates on other sections of the amendment.172 Thus, no re
corded debate on this issue ever took place,173 although prior to the
passage of the Bill of Rights the question of just compensation was
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 694-95.
at 699-700.
at 698.
at 701.
at 694-95.
170. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Technically, Madison was not
introducing the fifth amendment, but was suggesting that this clause be added in Article I,
section 9 between clauses three and four.).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 753.
173. Actually, Madison's National Gazette, March 29, 1792, piece does refer to the
taking of property for a public use, but the discussion gives little clarification of the mean
ing of the fifth amendment except to show that Madison, while recognizing that property is
important in society, also allowed it to be taken for social purposes. J. MADISON, supra
note 18, at 101-03.
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certainly not settled. 174
The fifth amendment had several important characteristics not
readily apparent on the face of the provision. First, the amendment
applied only to the national government and not to the states. Both
Anti-Federalists wishing to limit the national government, and liber
als, such as Madison, interested in protecting property, supported the'
just compensation clause as a limitation on national power.. The pas
sage of the amendment settled the question that eminent domain was
an inherent power of sovereignty and that there was no question that
the national government had this power. Colonial Americans appear
to have been more worried about just compensation and the national
government than uncompensated takings by the states. After the pas
sage of the fifth amendment, the states were still free to take property
as they had done in pre-amendment colonial times. 175
B.

Judicial Applications and the Mills Acts

There was very little litigation at the federal level concerning emi
nent domain and the takings clause of the fifth amendment until after
the Civil War,l16 Early American litigation on eminent domain oc
curred in state courts where legal compensation requirements were
minimal and the definition of a taking was narrowly construed to be
an actual physical taking of property.177 The Mills Acts are a good
example of this nineteenth century eminent domain property
litigation. 178
In many states, for example, Massachusetts, the construction of
grain mills required the building of dams that resulted in the flooding
of adjacent lands and the disturbing of riparian rights,l19 The Mills
Acts permitted this dam construction and flooding but the Acts and
many state court judges did not stipulate compensation. 180 Property
was damaged, but no legal injury resulted. Even though an individual
174. See supra notes 141-64 and accompanying text.
175. This may suggest that Lockean influences were more significant on the national
than on the state level where republican concerns were stronger.
176. The federal courts did not recognize the federal power of eminent domain until
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1 876}. The fifth amendment just compensation re
quirement was not applied to the states until 1897 in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rail
road v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). In Barron v. The Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the
Court and explicitly rejected the application of the fifth amendment and the Bill of Rights
to the individual states.
177. Comment, supra note ISS, at 708.
178. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 47-53.
179. [d.
180. [d. at 49-53; G. WHITE, supra note 132, at 55-61.
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property owner lost land to flooding, no legal taking occurred because
the owner did not lose complete use of the property. The lost property
was considered a legitimate sacrifice for the public good.
The Mills Acts were important in the early history of eminent
domain for several reasons. The Acts set a precedent for the transfer
of eminent domain to private individuals so long as the actions of the
private individuals served a public purpose. For example, creating a
grain mill was deemed a valid public use. 181 The notable opinions of
Massachusetts Justice Shaw on the Mills Acts upheld the transfer of
eminent domain to private parties so long as a public use ensued. 182
The Massachusetts cases paved the way for the subsequent transfer of
eminent domain to other private concerns, such as the railroads, so
long as a similar public use could be shown. 183 .
Few colonial or early post-Revolution state constitutions had a
public use stipulation for eminent domain. In their comprehensive
analysis of eminent domain law in America, Julius Sackman and Rus
sell Van Brunt claimed in Nichols on Eminent Domain that the taking
of property for private use was common practice in colonial America,
and that public use limitations were not even discussed when the first
post-Revolution state constitutions were created. 184 Although public
use limits became popular around 1800, the meaning of public use was
still a matter of some debate. 18s As Stoebuck and Philip Nichols indi
cated in their respective studies of eminent domain, the Mills Acts
made public use an important state justification for eminent domain,
defining public use as "for the public benefit."186 The Mills Acts were
thus important in influencing future understandings and limitations on
eminent domain power.
The judiciary broadly interpreted the term "public use" in con
struing the Mills ActS. 187 This reading of public use granted legisla
tures significant power to acquire property, often to the private benefit
of individuals, so long as some public benefit could be claimed. A
broad interpretation of public use competed with narrow construc
181. Meidinger, supra note 154. at 16, notes that prior to the Mills Acts, only the
Pennsylvania and Virginia constitutions had a public use stipulation.
182. G. WHITE, supra note 132, at 58-60.
183. See. e.g., Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837) (transfer of
eminent domain to railroad upheld).
184. 2A J. SACKMAN & R. VAN BRUNT, supra note 145, § 7.01.
185. Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B. U.L.
REV. 615, 617-21 (1940).
186. [d. at 619-21; Stoebuck, supra note 146, at 588-90.
187. Nichols, supra note 185, at 619-21.
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tions of the phrase that would later emerge. 188 The narrow definition
of public use was determined to mean "used by the public" and did
not give legislatures the power to take property as did a broad con
struction of the term. 189 Specifically, the public acquisition and trans
fer of property to private individuals for primarily private benefit
would not be permitted even if there were an incidental public benefit.
As stated earlier, early state eminent domain legislation in the
Acts did not require compensation for land flooded when a dam was
built. In general, the states did not require such compensation until
the mid-1840s. As late as 1820, the majority of the states had not
enacted compensation requirements for any taking of unimprOVed
land. l90 However, during the first half of the nineteenth century a
trend towards requiring compensation developed in the law. At the
same time, a countertrend also emerged that limited the scope or ap
plication of compensation. 19l For example, Justice Shaw's opinions
distinguished police power and regulation from takings. Shaw permit
ted some uncompensated takings as necessary for the public good. 192
Horwitz contended that a rule of limited compensation represented
one means for the rising entrepreneurial class to redistribute property
and power away from the traditional landed gentry.l93 Eminent do
main without compensation became an important subsidy for ec0
nomic development in that the property taken was put into more
productive use by an emerging mercantile class. New economic inter
ests, aligned with the judiciary in the state courts, supported an ex
panding eminent domain power so long as compensation was narrowly
defined. 194
The litigation over the Mills Acts exemplifies how state law and
188. Id. at 618-20.
189. See id. for a discussion of the competing "broad" and "narrow" meanings of
public use.
190. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 62.
191. Id. at 66.
192. G. WHITE, supra note 132, at 35-63. White discussed the opinions of Justices
Story, Kent, and Shaw and their differing approaches to property rights and eminent do
main. Id. White argued that both Story and Kent were hostile to the emerging eminent
domain power as a threat to private and traditional property rights. Id. In contrast, Shaw
was instrumental in the transformation of property rights and views of property from a
natural right to an instrumental or promotion of the public good theory of property. Id.
Other commentators have also made this observation. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at
52-53, 261. As noted earlier, the activity of early American state court judges represents a
significant amount of judicial activism in the face of legislatures not able or unwilling to
change the existing laws on property. See infra notes 202-15 and accompanying text.
193. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 63.
194. Id. at 261-63.
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the judiciary formulated much of the early American law on eminent
domain and changed "ancient property rules to the promotion of ec0
nomic development."l9s Until the 1850s, takings were construed nar
rowly to mean actual title transfer or complete loss of land use.1 96
Public use was construed to mean utilized by the public, and it justi
fied the transfer of eminent domain to private concerns.1 97 Just com
pensation was limited both in scope and the amount awarded. l98
Eminent domain permitted the taking of property to further nor
mal governmental functions, such as the construction of railroads and
public buildings. It was also used to help mills and other economic
projects.1 99 Additionally, eminent domain was used to further some
social welfare functions, such as building hospitals and poor houses. 200
It was even used to further aesthetic purposes such as the construction
of parks, the preservation of landscapes, and the maintenance of scenic
views. 20l
While the use of eminent domain was well established in the early
part of the nineteenth century, around the middle of the century the
meaning of public use and just compensation changed in ways that
again affected the status of property rights in many states. One early
example of this change is reflected in a New York State court decision,
Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson Railroad CO.202 At issue in Blood
good was a New York state law granting railroads the right to tres
pass, take private land, and compensate the owner to build rai1lines.
The statute did not contain a public use justification for this action.
Chancellor Walworth and Senator Tracy opined that the public use
doctrine applied to this type of taking and discussed the issue of what
actually constituted a taking for the public use. 203 While addressing
W. NELSON, supra note 49, at 159.
Nichols, supra note 185, at 619-21.
197. Id. at 618-19.
198. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 72; Lenhoff, supra note 146, at 618; Mei
dinger, supra note 154, at 27. Even sovereign immunity was passed on to private compa
nies. See commentary cited supra. Private companies were exempt from suit for any
damages caused to private property. At least one court ruled that even unanticipated dam
ages were nonrecoverable. Van Schoick v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 20 N.J.L. 249
(1843). The general principle of the day, damnum absque injuria, stressed that private
damages were part of the price one paid for the betterment of social conditions. M. HOR
WITZ, supra note 108, at 73. The individual property owner's compensation for sacrifice
was the ability to share in the better conditions of society.
199. Scheiber, supra note 108, at 399-400.
200. [d.
201. Meidinger, supra note 154, at 19. The latter uses did not emerge until the late
nineteenth century.
202. 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837).
203. Id. at 29, 77.
195.
196.
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the notions of public utility, public interest, and expediency, the court
settled on a narrow definition of public use as "used by the public,"
rejecting earlier and broader notions of public use that equated the
term with the public good. 204 Thus, since the railroads were used by
the pUblic, it was deemed appropriate for the state to allow the rail
roads to take land.
Bloodgood is significant because the court stated that the judiciary
and not the legislature was declared to be the arbiter of the meaning of
public use. 205 Bloodgood represented one of the first state cases in
which the judiciary failed to defer to a legislature to make public use
decisions. Moreover, Bloodgood was one of the first cases that de
clined to follow the broader notions of public use that previously had
eroded the legal protections of property against legislative regulation
and acquisition.
In 1843, a New York court reaffirmed this new judicial role and
trend towards limiting eminent domain. In Taylor v. Porter, 206 the
New York Supreme Court held that determinations of legitimate pub
lic use should be judicial and not legislative. In Taylor, the court
found unconstitutional a colonial law which allowed private roads to
be built across the property of another person. 207
Around the same time, Justice Shaw in Massachusetts made pub
lic use determinations which narrowed the scope of earlier decisions.
Prior decisions had given the state legislature broad authority to ac
quire land for public uses such as railroads, turnpikes, bridges, and
mills. 208 In Fiske v. Framingham Manufacturing CO.,209 Murdock v.
Stickney,210 and Chase v. Sutton Manufacturing Co. ,211 Justice Shaw's
opinions narrowed the eminent domain rulings of the Mills Acts, con
struing the Acts as a species of riparian land law. 212 Other states also
overruled earlier eminent domain decisions on Mills Acts and imposed
compensation and public use stipulations. 213 The significance of these
cases was to increase judicial protection for property rights by denying
legislatures wide discretion to define public uses. State courts, led by
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
Boston &
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 58-68.
Id. at 70-72.
4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
ld. at 147-48, 153.
See Fuller v. Dame, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 472 (1836); Boston Water Power Co. v.
W.R.R., 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 512 (1835).
29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 68 (1832).
62 Mass. (8 Cush.) (1851).
58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 152 (1849).
M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 261.
Scheiber, supra note 108, at 386.
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Chancellor Walworth in Bloodgood, narrowed the definition of public
use to mean "used by the public."214 The ruling of many of the courts
at this time indicated that all takings would require compensation, and
that they would make determinations as to valid public use. 21S
A trend towards compensation for takings, and a narrowing of
the definition of public use, grew out of what J.A.C. Grant called the
"higher law" background of eminent domain, and such protections
seemed to represent a triumph of Lockean ideology.216 According to
Grant, there existed in the nineteenth century a higher or natural the
ory oflaw that stood in contrast to the positive law. 217 This natural
law stood behind state laws and constitutions and recognized certain
rights of individuals, including the right to property.218 The concept
of a natural right to property, influenced by Locke's political philoso
phy, contlicted with state eminent domain law which, until then, had
generally required compensation for takings. This natural law tradi
tion was important in nineteenth century law and it represented a revi
val of the belief that property rights were absolute, at least in common
discourse. 219
These property rights were not political, as described by earlier
Lockean-Liberallanguage, but economic, and the conservative wing of
the jUdiciary argued that natural law required just compensation and
that a public use limit be attached to eminent domain. In cases such
as Gardner v. The Village ofNewburgh ,220 Chancellor Kent used natu
ral·law reasoning to require compensation for land flooded when the
village installed a public water system fed by a spring. In other cases
involving dams, canals, and roads, the courts also required compensa
tion based on similar natural law reasoning. 221
Grant cited numerous cases in the nineteenth century to show
how just compensation was dictated by natural law in order to protect
214. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837) (upholding transfer
ring of eminent domain to the railroad because railroads were "used by the public."). Im
plicit in the Bloodgood decision was a rejection of broader "for the public benefit"
definitions of public use. Nichols noted that throughout the nineteenth century, "narrow"
(used by the public) and "broad" (of public benefit) constructions of "public use" competed
as rival interpretations of eminent domain, with the broad meaning eventually winning out.
Nichols, supra note 185, at 617-23.
215. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 259-65.
216. Grant, supra note 139.
217. Id. at 68.
218. Id.
219. Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory in
the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 Hous. L. REv. 221, 225-26 (1987).
220. 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
221. Grant, supra note 139, at 72-73.

1991]

THE LOCKE REPUBLICAN DEBATE

185

property.222 Grant noted how Chancellor Kent, as early as 1832,
wished to apply the federal Bill of Rights to the states and make the
fifth amendment just compensation requirement apply to New
York. 223 From the middle 1800s to the end ofthe century, New York
and other state courts narrowed the meaning of public use by limiting
legislative discretion to determine its meaning. 224 After 1800 and
clearly by the Civil War, more and more states had constitutional pub
lic use and just compensation provisions to protect private property.22S
By 1897, natural law arguments led the United States Supreme Court
to apply the fifth amendment just compensation clause to the states. 226
CoNCLUSION

During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries eminent do
main was recognized as a valid power of the states to acquire property
for public projects, often without judicial scrutiny, and without com
pensation or public use limitations. 227 Early American history on
property rights does not indicate that either the courts or the legisla
tures were initially great defenders of property against eminent do
main or other forms of regulation. Property rights did not
significantly limit state legislative activity, and state court decisions
increased eminent domain power at the expense of these rights.
Lockean-Liberal rhetoric indicated that property rights were ab
solute political limits upon legislative activity.228 Property rights were
also described as crucial elements to maintaining republican govern
ment and individual liberty. This concept was abandoned at the state
level soon after 1787. Despite the pronouncements of the Founders,
property increasingly came to be described in economic terms and sub
ject to regulation for the common good. State courts and state emi
nent domain law were crucial in this early transformation of property
rights. The taking of unimproved land for mills or railroads, without
compensation, was permitted as a valid public use, even if the taking
primarily benefitted another private party.
In the 1820s, 1830s, and later, numerous jurists changed the
meaning of and strengthened property rights and put limits on emi
nent domain. While acknowledging that property was an economic
222. Id. at 71-77.
223. Id. at 76-77.
224. Id. at 79-81.
225. Id. at 80-85.
226. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
227. See supra notes 175-98 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
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good subject to legal regulation, state judges argued that natural laws
protecting property mandated that all takings of private property
would require compensation and would have to be for public use (with
judges determining what a valid public use was, and often ruling on
non-Lockean grounds). Additionally, during this time period, state
constitutions were rewritten with compensation and public use clauses
codifying and extending changes made in the courts.
Examination of colonial political theories and state litigation
reveals the deficiencies of current and popular interpretations of
American political thOUght stressing either the Lockean or Republican
origins and character of the American Founding. The existence of
Blackstone's legal and conventional views on property suggests that a
political language other than the Lockean or Republican theories in
fluenced early American political descriptions of property, the crea
tion of political institutions, and the definition of a legal apparatus to
govern the United States.
Neither Republican nor Lockean rhetoric, both of which treated
property as a political claim, can account for the transformation of
property into an economic commodity subject to regulation for the
common good, and perhaps a legalistic tradition indebted to Black
stone can not do so either. The definition of property in the nineteenth
century United States departed so significantly from earlier Republi
can or Liberal ideological concepts that it is difficult to describe the
legacy of American political institutions as essentially Liberal or Re
publican. While the Founders might in some contexts have said that
property was an absolute political right, in other contexts some lesser
view of property held sway. However, the subsequent treatment of
property in American law indicates that this lesser view of property
was either replaced by another conception of property, or that the
Founders' political rhetoric did not adequ~tely describe how they ac
ted upon their statements when it came time to create political institu
tions. In effect, they often followed one view about property in
political discourse, but acted differently when it came to treating prop
erty institutionally. Perhaps some ,hybrid language is the reality of
early America, with the Founders adopting and blending often contra
dictory views on certain ideas or concepts, including property. 229 At
the core of the American legal view of property is a tradition that
embodies contradictory or mUltiple meanings that compete for recog
nition in the constitution and in our legal tradition. 230
229.
230.

M. LIENESCH, supra note 14, at 7-9, made a similar claim.
Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea ofProperty, 72
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Whatever the reality of the meaning of property in America,
neither Republican nor Lockean language can adequately describe
how these theories moved from the level of political rhetoric, perme
ated political consciousness, and were translated into social reality.
Neither of the major philosophical schools which adopts a Lockean or
Republican view of the American Founding has thus far shown how
individuals acted upon specific rhetoric, unless the articulation of rhet
oric is considered a political act.231 Property rights, in either Republi
can or Liberal thought, may have been thought of as politically
important to individual liberty and as limits upon legislative power;
yet the practice of eminent domain and other regulations questions the
viability of using either the Lockean or Republican theories as exclu
sive and satisfactory interpretations of American politics with regard
to legal practice.
The legal rhetoric of Blackstone demonstrates better than Locke
or Republicanism an influence of greater depth as American institu
tions were formed by judges and legislators. In effect, state court juris
prudence and judicial activism highlight the transformation and
articulation of property rights rhetoric into American political institu
tions, and serve as examples of how to chart the diffusion of specific
political ideologies into political practice.

IOWA L. REv. 1319, 1319-21 (1987) (similar claim regarding dual constitutional tradition
as to the meaning and role of property rights in American society).
231. Of course, the articulation of rhetoric is sometimes considered a political act in
revolutionary situations.

